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Block play, the sand pit and the doll corner:  
the (dis)ordering materialities of educating young children 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Recent reconceptualisations of preschool education have tended to treat its role in ordering 
and subjectifying children with some suspicion.  This paper is an attempt to produce a less 
determined and thereby more hopeful, or at least ambivalent, account of the processes of 
subjectification by reexamining the peculiar materiality of the nursery.  I attempt to redeploy 
nursery education’s traditional emphasis on experiential and environmental learning towards 
thinking in terms of a performative and affective pedagogy of the event (largely inspired by 
Deleuze).  In so-doing, I conceive of a different kind of ‘interactive pedagogy’ which enacts 
myriad encounters and becomings.  This reconfigures the relationship between subject and 
object such that both are understood as continually emergent and constitutionally 
indeterminate.  Thinking in this way is to    embrace the disordering that lurks within the very 
processes of ordering.  In this sense, subjectification may not be ‘innocent’. but it is necessary 
nevertheless. 
Key words: preschool education, materiality, the event, affect, subjectification 
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Block play, the sand pit and the doll corner:  
the (dis)ordering materialities of educating young children 
 
 
 
introduction: what works? 
 
At first glance it might seem odd to talk of order and ordering in the nursery1.  Order is not 
necessarily the word that comes to mind when confronted with large numbers of children 
engaged in seemingly aimless ‘free play’ in an environment cluttered with ‘things’ - blocks, 
sand, dolls.  Nursery education seems to allow children ‘a freedom of being and expression 
which does not exist elsewhere within the education system’ (Dudek, 2000: 6).  Yet, the 
apparent disorder is somewhat illusory: nursery pedagogy may be largely ‘invisible’ (Bernstein, 
1977), but it does exist.  Little in the way of ‘work’ appears to go on but, in the nursery, play is 
a serious business. 
 
In the educational literature much has been made of the ways in which, despite 
appearances, preschool education acts as a governmental technology for ordering children 
(for example, Cannella, 1997, 2000; Dahlberg, 1999; Lubeck, 1996; Silin, 1995; Walkerdine, 
1984).  I do not want to dwell on what has become a sustained critique in this literature, but a 
brief summary is necessary here.  While more familiar educational practices are largely 
teacher-directed; preschool education is ‘child-centred’ (Walkerdine, 1984, in particular).  It is 
in this sense that Basil Bernstein (1977) has referred to nursery pedagogy as ‘invisible’: the 
standard practices of freedom in preschool education - of ‘free play’ or ‘free choice’ - make 
it appear that everything comes from the child, that nurseries simply encourage the ‘natural’ 
developmental unfolding of individual children.  It seems that nursery educators do very little.  
Yet, this developmental unfolding is far from open-ended, and nursery educators do more 
than ‘babysit’; everything that happens in the nursery is calculated to ensure the ‘normal’ 
development of children.  Universal developmental norms are enacted in ‘developmentally 
5 
appropriate practice’ which governs both preschool educators and children, ordering them 
as particular kinds of subject: 
‘True, we [preschool educators] don’t have children sitting at little desks, but we 
regulate their time and routines, remind them of rules, and surround them with uniform 
learning materials.  We may not ring bells or have long hallways to walk down, but our 
programmes for children are organised around schedules, standards, checklist, and 
assessment tools.  A more expansive vision for [preschool education] seems a distant 
consideration’ (Curtis and Carter, 2003: 1). 
 
To engage with nursery education is often to pose the question: ‘what works?’.  The question 
is implicit in the invisible workings of nursery pedagogy, the seeming inactivity of nursery 
educators, and in the instrumental production of future workers and citizens (see Dahlberg 
and Moss, 2005).  Such engagement seems either impossibly naive - Olds (2000) gives a 
particularly romanticised view of the nursery - or dismally fatalistic - the nursery simply 
‘predetermines the lives of others’ (Cannella, 2000).  Settling aside the romanticism entirely, it 
is not my intention here to argue that preschool education is ‘innocent’ of anything for which 
it stands accused in the literature.  But there must more to the nursery than this.  By this, I do 
not mean that I am going to elucidate some ever more opaque and insidious means through 
which the nursery orders its inhabitants, to uncover some as yet undisclosed procedure.  That 
is not what concerns me.  Without being naive, I want to treat the nursery with less suspicion.  
My contribution here may only be to advance the question - ‘what works?’ - in a more 
experimental sense, to evoke a broadly Deleuzian ‘pragmatism’ such that, ‘[t]he question is 
not, Is it true?  But, Does it work?  What new thoughts does it make it possible to think?’ 
(Massumi, 1992: 8).      
 
To do this, I want to orient myself (at least initially) towards the visible, rather than the invisible: 
to attend to the familiar materials in the nursery - the blocks, the sand, the dolls - and the 
everyday practices of playing with them.  Even so, I am not interested in a straightforward, 
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concrete materiality.  Rather, and largely inspired by Deleuze, I want to explore how the 
processes of active sensory exploration peculiar to preschool education might be understood 
as enacting an intangible and affective pedagogy of the event.  My intention in so-doing is 
not to provide a fuller, more accurate explanation of the processes of nursery education, to 
elucidate how it ‘really’ happens.  I simply want to try to conceive of the processes of 
subjectification in the nursery in more open-ended ways. 
 
In the next section I construct what can only be described as a ‘strategic’ history of the 
nursery tradition, in which I seek to draw out some of the principles from which nursery 
education proceeds  only to redeploy them in different ways later on.  I move on to explore 
the interactions between people and things in the nursery, such that we might conceive of 
both subject and object as emerging from, rather than causing, interaction.  Starting again 
from the sensate in the fourth section, I begin to ‘depersonalise’ these becomings so as to 
open things up to an emergent and incessant pedagogy of the event in the fifth.  From there 
I start to think through the ways in which preschool education might engage with the 
indeterminacy of the event.  
 
A strategic history of the nursery tradition: experiential and environmental learning  
 
Liz Brooker (2005) has remarked that nursery education has undergone surprisingly little 
change over the last 300 years or so.  In saying this, she is not arguing that nursery education 
is a static and homogenous field; rather her point is that there has been little visible change in 
the day-to-day practice of educating young children.  To the untrained eye it still looks like 
small children playing with toys.  Nursery education may have been reconceptualised in 
various ways over the years, but the endurance of certain principles have made it appear 
that little has changed.  Briefly summarised, nursery pedagogy can be said to be 
characterised by experiential and environmental learning.  In this section, and at some risk of 
caricature, I want to explore some of the ways in which action, embodiment, sensory 
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learning and materiality have been mobilised in particular approaches to nursery education.  
I make no claim to anything resembling a comprehensive history of nursery education, or 
even a thorough account of any individual approach.  Rather, my purpose is to pick up on 
certain themes and ways of thinking as a means of opening up space to rethink them in the 
sections that follow.  Thus forewarned, we can begin our ‘pop history tour’2. 
 
The idea that young children learn best through their senses - that they learn by ‘doing’ in 
interaction with the environment around them - has a long history.  From Johann Amos 
Comenius’ Didactica Magna (1910 [1632]) onwards the education of children under the age 
of 6 has largely concerned itself with engaging the senses (Lascarides and Hinitz, 2000; 
Peltzman, 1998).  Many of the so-called ‘pioneers’ (see Brooker, 2005) whose names litter the 
nursery tradition are famous for the innovative ways in which they offered physical materials 
to children so as to actively engage their bodies in learning.  Not least among these ‘great 
pioneers’ is Friedrich Froebel, widely credited as the ‘father of the kindergarten’ (by Curtis 
and Carter, 2003, for example).  Froebel is perhaps most famous for his system of ‘self-
directing’, concrete, manipulable materials - his ‘gifts’ and ‘occupations’ (Froebel, 1932, see 
also Wiggin and Smith, 1896a, 1896b, 1900).  Various adaptations of these can be found in 
many contemporary nurseries, although their use now tends to be less structured than Froebel 
envisaged.  Indeed, inspired by these ‘gifts’ and ‘occupations’, Deb Curtis and Margie Carter 
conceive of the role of nursery educators in terms of offering aesthetically pleasing 
manipulable materials to children as ‘invitations to learning’ (2003: 2). 
 
Maria Montessori’s work followed on from Froebel in many ways.  In her nurseries, Montessori 
employed not ‘teachers’ or ‘educators’ but ‘directresses’3.  They did not direct the children, 
however, at least not in any straightforward way.  Montessori’s directresses were to organise 
and arrange materials ‘with attention to order, aesthetics and sensory exploration’ (Curtis 
and Carter, 2003: 2), to produce ‘self-directing’ learning environments in which children could 
be ‘free’ to explore and learn at their own pace (Montessori, 1912, 1917, 1988, see also 
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Lascarides and Hinitz, 2000; Peltzman, 1998).  Thus, both Montessori and Froebel  understood 
learning as occurring through the embodied and sensory interactions between individual 
children and the material environment around them; the task of educating young children, 
then, is one of devising and arranging materials, such that those materials ‘do’ the teaching.   
 
In the latter half of the 20th century, nursery education found scientific confirmation for its 
belief in concrete ‘hands-on learning materials and experiences’ (Curtis and Carter, 2003: 2) 
in Piagetian developmental psychology.  Piaget is notable not only for having produced the 
universal and deterministic staged model of child development which he is (im)famous (see, 
for example, James, Jenks and Prout, 1998); he also understood learning as an individualistic 
constructivism, an active process through which individual children assimilate and adapt to 
the physical environment around them (1952, 1954, see also Corsaro, 1997; MacNaughton, 
2003).  Such developmentalism remains a strong influence in the imagination of 
contemporary preschool education.  The High/Scope movement, which has spread far 
beyond it’s origins in Michigan, USA, in the 1970s, explicitly sites its ‘cognitively-oriented 
curriculum’ within a developmental framework.  That is, High/Scope provide a full range of 
‘key’ experiences to ensure ‘normal’ child development (Hohmann, Banet and Weikart, 1979, 
see also Curtis and Carter, 2003; MacNaughton 2003).  To achieve this High/Scope educators 
organise and plan their material environments into a series of ‘learning centres’ or ‘activity 
areas’, such as the block play area, the sand pit and the doll corner.  In this way, they embed 
the curriculum in the learning environment, planning and resourcing their environments to 
sign-post and create pathways to particular learning goals (Edwards and Knight, 1994).  
 
High/Scope does not conceive of learning as an entirely individual process, however.  
Inspired by social constructivist developmental psychologies (largely in the Vygotskian 
tradition), High/Scope also attends to the social processes of learning.  Vygotsky (1978, see 
also Corsaro 1997) understood learning as occurring in what he termed the ‘zone of proximal 
development’ between children’s actual level of development (what they can achieve 
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individually) and a potential level of future development (which they are only able to 
achieve with the support of adults or their peers at present).  Jerome Bruner has famously 
referred to this as the ‘social scaffolding’ of learning (MacNaughton, 2003).  This is manifested 
in the daily High/Scope ‘plan-do-review’ routine (Hohmann, Banet and Weikart, 1979) in 
which children begin each day by negotiating with educators to plan their activities for that 
day before going off to carry them out independently.  At the end of each day the children 
return to their educators to reflect upon their progress in those activities.  In this way, the 
High/Scope approach provides a social framework within which children can engage in 
experiential learning in a carefully planned material environment. 
 
The Reggio Emilia approach to preschool education (the final stop on our short tour), draws 
upon many of the same influences as High/Scope, but brings them together in slightly 
different ways.  Most interesting for my purposes here is the way in which Reggio Emilia 
educators conceive of the learning environment as an educator in its own right, as a ‘space 
that teaches’ (Gandini, 1998).  Yet, this is not simply the concrete environment, but a ‘total 
environment’ with social, cultural, discursive as well as physical characteristics (Nutbrown and 
Abbott, 2001; Moss and Petrie, 2002).  Thus, the Reggio Emilia approach can be said to 
conceive of a broader socio-materiality, such that learning can be understood to occur in 
the relations between people, and between people and ‘things’. 
 
Emerging from in-between things 
 
Beyond all doubt, young children learn from action ... it is action and interaction with 
people and things that count’  (Greenman, 1988: 29, my emphasis). 
Moving forward from this highly selective history, I want to begin to make tactical use of the 
proposition that ‘[m]ateriality is agency’ (as suggested by Dewsbury et al, 2002: 439).  This 
proposal only starts to make sense in the context of a broader reconsideration of subjectivity 
and materiality, of what we understand it is to be human.  This requires nothing less than an 
10 
ontological shift.  The accounts of subjectification so briefly discussed in the introduction 
presume a particular relationship between subject and object as, admittedly, do the ideas 
that characterise the nursery tradition.  There is a straightforwardness to their materialism: 
matter is understood as concrete - as real, grounded, and physical (see Kearnes, 2003, for a 
similar commentary on materiality as deployed in the geographical literature).  An inert world 
of ‘dead matter’ is opposed to the immaterial, the world of representation and ideas that 
constitutes our subjectivity (Anderson, 20044).   Despite my earlier comment about the ‘socio-
materiality’ of the Reggio Emilia approach, the material in ‘total environments’ may become 
caught up in a range of social, cultural and discursive relations, but it is remains stubbornly 
physical and inert nonetheless. 
 
What I have tried to bring out in my strategic history, however, is the crucial role that objects 
play in the performance of subjects.  In this sense, we can start to think about how materials 
could have some ‘life’, not in the usual human sense, and certainly not any life of their own, 
but one in interaction with others (see Thrift, 1996).  This is reminiscent of Jane Bennett’s (2001) 
‘enchanted materialism’, which seeks to affirm the liveliness of matter without reducing it to 
human faculties like ‘imagination’ or ‘will’ ( Anderson, 2004).  This ontological flattening, which 
makes no a priori distinction or hierarchisation between subject and object, could be said to 
evoke a symmetrical anthropology in Latour’s terms, redefining humans as networked 
‘mediators’: ‘[t]he human is in the delegation itself, in the pass, in the sending, in the 
continuous exchange of forms’ (1993: 138).  Accordingly, to claim that ‘materiality is agency’ 
is more than to attempt to enliven the material; it also begins to ‘depersonalise’ the self.  That 
is not to say that we should think in terms of a ‘post-human’ geography.  For all the talk of the 
‘impersonal’ in this paper: 
‘[T]he environments of our daily chores, [our nurseries] ... are indeed ours; this is a 
human geography - “a passage that is experienced and real.  A duration (Deleuze, 
1988: 39)”.  The point is to build the strange ballet of uncertainty, of catastrophic (unfair) 
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accident, of things in themselves, into our stories’ (Dewsbury, 2000: 492, original 
emphasis). 
 
Thus, while the proposition ‘materiality is agency’ makes no a priori distinction between 
human subjects and inhuman objects; the two emerge from it as distinct entities.  It implies an 
emergent and constitutionally unfinished ‘almost-not quite’ ontology in which all being is 
becoming (Thrift, 1996).  Brian Massumi articulates this in terms of the primacy of process and 
change over concrete forms and stasis.  By primacy, however, he does not mean that 
process transcends stasis, or that it comes first in a simple chronology; it is more a question of 
emphasis, of priority without prior-ness.  It is in this sense that he is able to claim that: ‘a thing is 
when it isn’t doing ... concrete is as concrete doesn’t’ (2002a: 6).  Here Massumi draws on 
Bergson’s (1998) account of the paradox of Zeno’s arrow (see also Dewsbury, 2000).  For 
Bergson, the arrow moves not between discernible points on its passage from bow to target; 
it moves because it is never in any point at all, it is always in-between, in transit across them 
all.  The individual positions can be identified only retrospectively.   
 
Marcus Doel’s ‘post-structuralist’ geography understands the world as always in-between.  In 
rejecting ‘pointillism’, thinking in terms of the back-formed ‘bits’ and ‘pieces’ that appear to 
make up the world, Doel favours an ongoing ‘scrumpled’ geography modelled on the art of 
origami (1996, see also 1999).  Drawing of Deleuze’s Baroque Leibnizism (see Deleuze, 2006), 
Doel argues that ‘we’ are not points but folds, always in the process of folding.  This begins to 
explain another of  Dewsbury and colleagues’ tactics5: ‘[s]pace is a verb not a noun’ (2002: 
439).  Thinking in terms of ‘spacing’, as process, rather than space, as an entity, is to think in 
terms of becomings.  It is to begin from Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that ‘[w]e are not in 
the world, we become with the world’ (1994: 169, my emphasis). 
12 
In this way, we can begin to think of subjects and objects as points that emerge from the 
world in process: 
‘It is from the active, productive, and continual weaving of the multiplicity of bits and 
pieces that we emerge ... The ‘I’, the bounded subject, stands after these compositions 
as a mythical unity’ (Harrison, 2000: 502). 
The subject may be a (momentary) outcome, rather than a cause, but it is both real and 
actual regardless.  There is a minimal subjectivity in becoming (Dewsbury, 2000).  The 
emergent subject is more than the ‘classical’ poststructural subject: a multiple and 
contingent ‘trace’ rather than a ‘cipher’ (Thrift, 1996).  To think of subjectivity in this way is to 
reject the claim that, at least until recently6, has exemplified the conceptual and ethical 
moment of the ‘new social studies of childhood’ almost in their entirety: that children should 
be studied ‘as social actors, as beings in their own right rather than pre-adult becomings’ 
(Holloway and Valentine, 2000: 5).  Admittedly, what the ‘new social studies of childhood’ 
rejects is the (over)determination of children as future-adults-in-the-making, particularly when 
understood in terms of linear and universal child development, in favour of taking them 
seriously in the present tense.  Unfortunately, the result has been to vilify the very notion of 
becoming, leaving only a static and coherent model of subjectivity which makes it very 
difficult to think through children’s insistent and strikingly apparent changeability. 
 
It seems to me that thinking of the world in as always-already in process might allow us to 
conceive of the experiential and environmental processes of learning in the nursery 
differently.  Indeed, thinking in terms of a performative pedagogy of the event may allow us 
to think difference, rather than identity.  Representational thought, in proceeding through 
judgement and analogy, is unable to think of anything other than stasis and identity.  Instead 
Deleuze proposes that thinking in terms of difference-in-itself is to open up to the world as 
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always-already in process (1994).  With this in mind I want to revisit the initial claim of the 
nursery tradition: that young children learn best through their senses. 
 
Engaging the senses 
 
‘As children work with these materials, they are learning about themselves and their role 
using the physical properties of the world.  Children are transfixed by looking at, 
touching, tasting, and moving and rearranging things.  As they absorb the rich sensory 
information around them, their brain pathways are making connections that will be the 
foundation for a lifetime of experience and learning’ (Curtis and Carter, 2003: 106). 
Deb Curtis and Margie Carter are alluding to the latest scientific rationalisation of the 
traditional practice of nursery education: neuroscience.  This may provide a useful point of 
departure.  Conceiving of the self as emerging from a series of impersonal connections 
formed in the brain (see also Deleuze, 1995) might help us to start to think of an ‘affective 
materialism’: ‘a materialism that thinks through how a quasi-idealist/quasi-corporeal 
dimension of affect is internal, rather than in supplement or opposition, to materiality 
(Anderson, 2004: page/s).  For both Deleuze and preschool education, ‘[o]n the path which 
leads to that which is being thought, all begins with sensibility’ (1994: 144).  Deleuze’s 
deployment of sensibility, however, differs radically from that employed in the nursery 
tradition.  Deleuze does not advocate a straightforward empiricism in which experience is 
understood as a first principle from which all else proceeds.  Thinking as such is to posit a 
badly formed question (see Deleuze, 1991): ‘It is not the question “Does the intelligible come 
from the sensible?” but a quite different proposition, that of relations’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 
2002: 55).  Yet, these relations are external to their terms: ‘[r]elations are in the middle, and 
exist as such’ (ibid: 55).  Deleuze’s empiricism, therefore, is a transcendal empiricism; what 
transcends is an in-betweenness, a being-in-relation. 
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As neither the body or the subject, nor sense data from the ‘real’ world outside the self, the 
sensate can be conceived of as such an in-betweenness (Harrison, 2000).  To think of 
sensation in this way is to produce an impersonal and asubjective account of the world; one 
of affects rather than affections, percepts not perceptions: 
‘Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who 
experience them.  Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the 
strength of those who undergo them.  Sensations, percepts and affects are beings 
whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 
164, original emphasis). 
Speaking in terms of affects and percepts, Deleuze and Guattari break down sensation into 
its ‘brute, felt, building blocks’ (Dewsbury, 2003: 1914).  But, affects and percepts are 
attributable to neither a subject, nor an object which appears to be affecting that subject; 
they belong to the relation itself, that which is between both subject and object, and from 
which they emerge.  This explains Massumi’s insistence that all of this is ‘nothing personal’ 
(2002a).  As Dewsbury and colleagues put it: 
‘Affects are not about you or it, subject or object.  They are relations that inspire the 
world ... affects and percepts are that through which subject and object emerge and 
become possible, they speak to the emergent eventuality of the world’ (2002: 439, 
original emphasis). 
Thinking through the sensible - rather than the senses - allows us to think outwith a framework 
of representational subjectivity.  It is to conceive of the impersonality of ‘life’ in the 
immanence and intangibility of the event (Dewsbury, 2003).  This virtuality7 is what Thrift is 
referring to when he speaks of the ‘push’ of life (2004) or what Massumi terms the ‘flash’ 
(2002b). 
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Figure 1: water play 
 
But, what could it mean to think of the sensibility of the nursery?  The photograph (figure 1) 
shows a group of 4-year-old boys engaged in water play with a selection of cups and 
bubbles: a fairly typical scene in most nurseries.  Curtis and speak of the ‘magic’ and 
‘wonder’ of active sensory exploration and the almost miraculous things this can achieve: 
‘Embedded within the seemingly magical phenomena of rainbows, shadows, gems, 
and the rustling of trees in the wind are important concepts related to physics, science, 
and math’ (2003: 122). 
Less romantically8, we might conceive of water play in terms of ‘miraculation’ or ‘fabulation’, 
of the affects and percepts that constitute ‘blocs of becoming’.  For Deleuze and Guattari 
‘[w]e write not with childhood memories but through blocs of childhood that are the 
becoming-child of the present’ (1994: 168).  Or, in the terms used in A Thousand Plateaus, 
‘unnatural participations’ in heterogenous assemblages constitute blocs of becoming from 
which subject and object emerge (1988).  Understood in this way, the water, the bubbles and 
the cups do not represent the various properties of the world, nor do they represent the 
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concepts related to scientific or mathematical apprehension of them.  Rather, the act of 
playing, the encounter between the boys and these materials can be said to enact these 
properties.  It is an ‘experiment’ that produces becomings-science and becomings-maths, 
among myriad other potential and actual becomings.  Both the boys and the materials 
emerge from this virtual event, ‘[l]argely the same but with some difference - if only by virtue 
of having come to be themselves again’ (Massumi, 2002a: 232). 
 
In a similar spirit, Kevin Hetherington takes James Gibson’s (1986) notion of ‘affordances’ to 
think through the ways in which subject and object are blurred in such encounters, such that 
meaning is generated in the ‘space of affordances’ between them.  Hetherington argues: 
‘[h]umans do not act as subjects in an object world but are constituted as perceiving beings 
at the interface between subject and object’ (2003: 1938).  He contends that the distinction 
between experiencing subject (the boys) and experienced object (the water, the bubbles, 
the cups) dissolves in the idea of praesentia: ‘a subjectivity found through the encounter with 
what is at hand’ (ibid: 1941, original emphasis).  Or, to elaborate: 
‘Praesentia is a way of knowing the world that is both inside and outside of knowledge 
as a set of represented practices.  It is also performative and generative of knowledge 
communicated other than through representation.  Both as a form of the present and a 
form of presencing something absent, it can be found in tacitly skilled, haptic reaching 
out and does not presume in advance the necessity of a visual act of representation, 
let alone its outcome as knowledge that can be communicated discursively to others.  
Rather, praesentia presumes only an involvement and a confirmation of subject 
formation in the materiality of the world’ (ibid: 1937, original emphasis). 
 
The point here is not that such sensate encounters are in some way non-cognitive, that we 
should allow for the existence of ‘non-cognitive facts’ (Thrift, 1996); it is more that the sensate 
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constitutes the ‘unthought in thought’, an unthought which is ‘not external to thought but lies 
at it’s very heart’ (Deleuze, 1988: 97).  Sensate encounters can be said to be enactments 
from which cognition emerges: 
‘[P]articipation precedes recognition: being precedes cognition.  The separately 
recognisable, speakable identities of the objects and subjects involved in the unfolding 
event come into definition only retrospectively.  In the event, they are inseparable from 
the immediacy of the relation’ (Massumi, 2002a: 231, original emphasis). 
That being so, we can start to think of the event not as a subject, but the conditions from 
which one can emerge.  The emergent subject is actualised from the impersonal forces and 
relations - the affects and percepts - that are enacted and assembled in the event, its 
apparent unity is simply a holding-together which allows us to appear to ourselves as agents 
(Dewsbury, 2000).  The event is folded into and precipitative of a subject (Deleuze, 2006), but 
it is impersonal nevertheless, ‘[s]ubjectification isn’t anything to do with a ‘person’: it’s a 
specific collective individuation relating to an event’ (Deleuze, 1995: 99).   
 
A pedagogy of the event 
 
Thinking in terms of a pedagogy of the event is to think of ‘emergence’ rather than 
‘development’.  Within the educational literature there is much talk of emergence, of 
‘emergent curricula’ (see MacNaughton, 2003) and ‘interactive pedagogy’ (Fendler, 2001).  
Indeed, such practices explicitly advocate a pedagogy of in-betweenness: neither ‘child-
centred’ nor ‘teacher-directed’ but which occurs in the interaction between teacher and 
child.  The Reggio Emilia preschools are often lauded on this very basis, for practising a 
‘pedagogy of listening and relationships’ (Moss and Petrie, 2002) which emphasises 
‘negotiated learning’ (Forman and Fyfe, 1998) such that the curriculum can be understood 
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as ‘a metaphorical dance between teacher and child’ (Rinaldini, in Valentine, 2003).  While 
such practices are ostensibly contingent, they are premised on an all too human model of 
subjectification, and they are targeted to achieve predetermined ends:  
‘The procedures used in interactive pedagogies may appear to be free because they 
are not specified in advance; but the success of such a pedagogy is evaluated 
according to the degree to which a specific outcome is achieved.  The procedure 
may be flexible, but the outcome is ironically predetermined.  Flexible interactive 
pedagogies are not necessarily instances of freedom or emancipation but rather 
effective and efficient technologies for attaining predetermined socially stipulated 
outcomes’ (Fendler, 2001: 133) 
 
The problem here could be said to be one of ethics: a failure to become worthy of the event 
in all its singularity (Deleuze, 2004), to still the incessant emergence of the event and to close 
off its indeterminate openness.  ‘De-eventualising’ the nursery renders the objects and 
subjects that make it up docile and lifeless (Dewsbury, 2000; 2003; Doel, 1999; Harrison, 2000; 
2002; Thrift, 1996; 2004; Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000).  Quite simply, it produces a fatalistic and 
over-determined account of the nursery.  Perhaps the problem here is the imperialism of 
contemporary preschool pedagogy in its attempts to determine ever more of the child.  Lynn 
Fendler (2001) has argued that the  current drive towards a totalising ‘whole child’ education 
has effected a shift in the ‘substance’ to be educated.  By this, she means that while earlier 
educational imperatives were targeted at specific parts of the child - the intellect or the 
morals - ‘whole child’ education also orients itself towards desire: the spirit, soul, motivations, 
wishes, pleasure and inclinations of the child.  Even fantasy is an educational resource in the 
nursery (Paley, 2004).  Fendler attributes this to the need to educate ideal advanced liberal 
subjects: ‘entrepreneurial selves’ who desire their own fulfillment (see also Rose, 1999).   
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Yet, desire need not be understood as a lack to be filled, as the Lacanian psychoanalytic 
account goes, nor indeed as some kind of ‘substance’ to be moulded.  Instead, desire might 
be thought of as process - as impetuous, disorderly and irreducible emergence (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2003).  Deleuze and Guattari understand desire as constituting a ‘body without 
organs’.  This is not a body in the straightforward sense, but a virtual body, a body from the 
point of view of its potential9 (Harrison, 2000).  The ‘organism’ or subject emerges as a 
stratification or determination of this virtual body, as ‘a phenomenon of accumulation, 
coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labour from the [body without 
organs], imposed upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchised organisations, 
organised transcendences’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 159).  For Massumi (2002a) this is a 
process not simply of actualising potential, the affects and percepts enacted in the event, 
but of capturing this in habit, delimiting it simply as possibility.  In this sense we might think of 
the nursery as setting up myriad apparatuses of capture (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) which 
personalise and domesticate the event (Massumi, 2002b).   
 
While this stratification may reduce the potential of the body to do things otherwise; ‘[s]taying 
stratified - organised, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988: 161).  Stratifications and subjectifications are the very things that enable us to 
act: ‘you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to 
respond to the dominant reality’ (ibid: 160).  There is a need to hold on to some subjectivity, 
the minimal subjectivity enacted in a doing that will allow the event(s) of the world to go on 
without dissolving entirely within them (Dewsbury, 2000).  ‘We’ are able to sustain ourselves by 
keeping things in motion, in the eternal return of difference-producing-repetition (Deleuze, 
1994), such that ‘we’ are never static even if we appear as such.  While the event is 
underway, however, there can be no guarantee of the outcome.  Becomings are always to 
some degree speculative: 
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‘Every experience, as it happens, carries a fringe of active indetermination.  Experience 
underway is a constitutionally vague ‘something doing’ in the world ...  Subject and 
object are embedded in the situational relation in a way that cannot be fully 
determined in advance.  As long as the event is ongoing, its outcome even slightly 
uncertain, their contextual identity is open to amendment’ (Massumi, 2002a: 232). 
 
Playing with things: embracing the indeterminate? 
 
There is always something excessive about the event, an inherent openness that defies any 
absolute predetermination: potential disorder lurks within the ordering process itself.  But, that 
is not to say that attempts cannot be made to capture the event and shape its outcomes in 
various ways: ‘[i]ndeterminancy and determination, change and freeze framing, go 
together’ (Massumi, 2002a: 8).  While the event itself may be intangible, the world that 
continually emerges through it is not, and the two are entirely inter-related: 
 ‘[T]he relativity between all the components ‘present’ for an event to exist is inexclusive 
- everything has equal comport within the event itself... objects are as important to the 
event as you are take them away and the event changes, you change, thus 
completely recasting the notion of the subject’ (Dewsbury, 2000: 491). 
In this way we might begin to think of nursery pedagogy as attempting to regulate ‘the 
combinations (doses) of aggregates’ (Harrison, 2000: 513).  The practice of arranging nursery 
environments into learning centres could be viewed as an attempt to control and delimit the 
event - to ‘de-eventualise’ it - to offer possibilities rather than to engage with potential.  Much 
as Montessori employed ‘directresses’, Curtis and Carter, advocate that, among other things, 
nursery educators should be ‘prop managers’: ‘[t]he idea here is not to be policing the 
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materials, but allowing the children to stay focused and engaged’ (2003: 187)10.  The practice 
of nursery education, then, is very much concerned with ‘dosing’ the aggregates: 
‘The presentation of materials makes a difference in how children respond to them.  
Make sure the arrangement is orderly and attractive and that it suggests possibilities for 
use.  Baskets, trays, tubs, mirrors, or other surfaces define the area and help children 
focus their attention on what is available.  Avoid the cluttering effect of combining 
different-looking implements and utensils together in one arrangement.  Offer sets of 
things that match and complement each other so the children have a clearer view of 
what is there and how it might be used’ (ibid: 106) 
 
Changing the material organisation of the nursery, whether disordering or re-ordering, has 
very real consequences in terms of the events that are afforded and the subjects that can 
emerge.  Glenda MacNaughton’s collaborative action research project aimed to alter the 
gender relations in a group a Australian preschool classrooms.  One of the educators 
involved, Nette, was having difficulty convincing her colleagues that the curriculum should 
be concerned with more than simply how and when materials should be presented to 
children:  
‘[W]hether you have playdough before milk and fruit, or after...  Should you have 
cutters and things with the [play]dough or should you just let them manipulate it?...  
Well that’s what they’re calling curriculum’ (in Macnaughton, 2000: 179).   
This may seem prosaic, but these are very real concerns for nursery educators who worry that 
too early an introduction to cutters or rolling pins might inhibit children’s creative exploration 
of the physical properties of the playdough itself.  Introducing such materials could take the 
play in all manner of unwanted directions.  MacNaughton agrees with Nette that, if they 
want to practice for ‘gender-equity’ rather than simply (child) development, preschool 
educators need to think beyond the materiality of the curriculum. 
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Nevertheless, Nette’s personal gender equity project centred around the material 
organisation of ‘learning centres’.  She wanted to disrupt the taken-for-granted gender roles 
in her classroom, which she saw as embedded within the material organisation of the nursery.  
In common with many other preschool educators, Nette wanted to disrupt the notion that 
‘blocks were for boys and home corner for girls’ (ibid: 180).  Gender issues are often 
understood as territorialised in the block play and the home corner areas of preschool 
classrooms, and their resolution is believed to lie in reconfiguring these areas in various ways 
(for example, Curtis and Carter, 2003; Davies, 1989; Paley, 1984).  Nette’s response was 
explicitly to ‘present kindergarten equipment to children in a manner which discourages 
gender bias’ (in MacNaughton, 2000: 162); specifically, to bring the outside blocks inside and 
combine them with the home corner equipment.  This proved a controversial move, 
however, with other educators in the research group.  Edna, in particular, argued that there 
was a need to separate the two because they afforded specific and distinctive learning 
experiences: 
‘It gives a sense of order and categories for children...  we are preparing children for 
the next step.  It’s why we are doing it...  We would have to look very closely to justify 
ourselves if we were doing it differently.  If we had everything down one end of the 
room and the children just went and got whatever they wanted to use wherever and 
however they wanted... (fades).  I know a lot of teachers who would get very upset if 
the children moved the equipment together’ (ibid: 163). 
For Edna such experimentation with room arrangement was dangerous, even upsetting.  Not 
only might it impede ‘normal’ child development, but it could also enact all kinds of 
‘potential monstrosities’ (Dewsbury, 2000: 491).  While Edna was committed to achieving 
gender equity, she believed that such re-orderings would most likely enact unhelpful and 
unpredictable disorderings.  Messing with things in the nursery can be perilous! 
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There can, however, be great rewards for nursery educators who are willing to countenance, 
indeed risk, some indeterminancy.  Curtis and Carter believe that the standardised and 
sanitatised materials made available to children in preschool education can have damaging 
effects (or produce problematic affects).  Without ignoring ‘health and safety’, they 
advocate the use of ‘open-ended’, ‘indeterminate’ materials11 in the nursery: 
‘In addition to keeping children safe, you want to challenge their minds, bodies and 
social skills with materials that invite more complex play, collaboration, problem solving, 
and creativity...  They benefit from working with more than a standard set of unit blocks, 
Lego building blocks, people and animal props.  The skills and knowledge children 
possess and are eager to acquire usually surpass the limited learning opportunities of 
early childhood materials designed for specific uses’ (2003: 69). 
Curtis and Carter believe that play with ‘open-ended’ materials can enact particular kinds of 
becomings.  By inviting movement, manipulation, investigation, experimentation, creation 
and problem solving, ‘indeterminate’ materials ‘encourage children to become flexible 
thinkers and responsive playmates’ (ibid: 57).  In addition, they believe that introducing all 
manner of recycled and natural materials will produce subjects who are both flexible and 
sustainable.   
 
Despite the promise of such materials, Curtis and Carter remain somewhat wary of them.  
Play with loose parts and found materials is risky: ‘successful operations require eternal 
vigilance to ensure that they are in no way infected by disorderly and entropic tendencies’ 
(Edensor, 2005: 313).    Yet the inherent openness of the event means that all material in the 
nursery must be carefully managed.  Materials need to be ordered and arranged to 
compensate for and control their inherent disorderly, and disordering, tendencies: 
24 
‘There is a delicate balance between offering children a range of interesting materials 
and avoiding clutter and an over-emphasis on ‘stuff’... When children come upon a 
cluttered shelf with a pile of materials in textures and colours that have no relationship 
to each other, they are less likely to be able to see what is available for their use ... If 
they live in mess, disorder, and clutter, they will likely create more disorder, rather than 
using the materials thoughtfully’ (Curtis and Carter, 2003: 182). 
If nursery educators want to enact particular processes of subjectification, they must be 
careful lest things descend into ‘chaos’. 
 
(im)material (dis)orderings: in lieu of a conclusion 
 
‘What we lack most is a belief in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, it’s been taken 
from us.  If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that 
elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volume...  
Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our 
every move.  We need both creativity and a people’ (Deleuze, 1995: 176). 
Throughout this paper I have been attempting to think through how we might produce a less 
fatalistic account of nursery education such that we might conceive of subjectification as not 
‘innocent’ but necessary nevertheless.  This could be said to be little more than a task of 
‘witnessing’ the nursery: attending to the encounters that open it up while resisting the 
imperialistic urge to totalise and explain.  Conceiving of an impersonal, but no less 
subjectifying for that, pedagogy of the event is an attempt to witness the nursery in this way: 
‘[It] means s thinking about what is going on, to think of events rather than subjectivities, 
to realise that there are hidden, intangible, associations (affects and percepts) of 
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emotion, desire and faith existing between subject (individual body) and object 
(material world)’ (Dewsbury, 2003: 1915). 
However, affirmation of the world in as ever-contingent, always becoming-otherwise, is not 
necessarily to introduce a naive utopianism or an unstoppable vitalism.  Paul Harrison 
(forthcoming) reminds us that Deleuze’s vitalism, his ‘affirmation of the multiple’ (2004), 
cannot be understood other than with reference to his stoicism, such that the world does not 
simply overflow with meaning but emerges from and because of the disaster of meaningless.   
An understanding of the world through relations of ’speed and slowness’ (Doel, 1999) must 
also consider the stillings and slowings which hold it back, hold it in place, as much as the 
ways in which it picks up speed.  We should consider the world as lessening as well as in 
plenitude (Anderson, 2004).  In thinking of a pedagogy of the event, we may affirm the 
potential disorder that is immanent to, and can be enacted within, its myriad orderings - we 
may introduce some hope, but it is always a hope without guarantee (Massumi, 2002b).  As 
Peter Moss and Pat Petrie (2002) note, amidst the potential of the nursery, its becomings-
otherwise, we necessarily find instrumentality and closure all the same.  In all its (dis)ordering 
(im)materiality, a pedagogy of the event introduces some optimism but only does so in the 
face of despair.  Defeat may always be momentary12, but it occurs nonetheless.  Strangely 
enough, this need not be pessimistic so long as ‘we’ continue to experiment in the event: 
‘Bleak it is at first glance.  But is is ultimately joyous’ (Massumi, 1992: 40). 
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1 By the nursery I am thinking of those institutions concerned with the education of preschool 
children, particularly those between the ages of 3 and 5 within the various national systems 
within the UK.  Internationally, it is more common to talk in terms of a broader early childhood 
education encompassing the age range from birth to 8 but this is by no means an 
homogenous field.  While there has been some movement towards an equivalent idea of 
‘early years’ education within the UK in recent years, the education of children between 3 
and 5 remains a distinct stage within this with its own curriculum guidance which draws on 
the principles distinctive to the nursery (or kindergarten) tradition in education.  However, 
while the nursery may be a peculiarly British institution in many ways, more or less equivalent 
institutions do exist in most educational systems in the ‘global north’.  
2 I intend this to resonate in various ways.  Most obviously, in the light of the theoretical 
influences in this paper, it alludes to Deleuze’s urgings towards a ‘pop philosophy’ (1995).  
Also, the irreverent tone introduced by such allusions to a ‘celebrity tour’ of the nursery 
tradition touch upon Richard Johnson’s frustration with what he terms the ‘cargo cult’ 
mentality of, particularly Anglo-American, preschool educators such that they unreflectively 
latch on to each new idea only to move on when the next ship comes in (2000).  In this sense, 
the celebrity ‘pioneers’ of the nursery tradition can be said to have a cult following.  Johnson 
is particularly suspicious of the current fad for uncritically appropriating the Reggio Emilia 
approach.  While I think Johnson may be a little uncharitable to nursery educators, the history 
of nursery education does resemble that of a succession of celerity followings. 
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3 Montessori’s use of the term ‘directresses’ very much reflects the assumptions of the time in 
which she was working.   
4 Ben Anderson intends this to resonate with calls for a performative and ‘non-
representational’ enlivening of our ‘dead geographies’ (Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000, see also 
Thrift, 2004), which may be somewhat akin to what I am trying to do here. 
5 Dewsbury and colleagues list 14 ‘tactical suggestions’ or ‘disposable maxims’ for 
‘presenting’ or ‘witnessing’ the world.  It would be far beyond the scope of this paper to 
examine the list in its entirety, but the final two suggestions seem particularly apt in terms of 
my discussion here. 
6 In his recent work Alan Prout has begun to distance himself from a project for which he is 
largely responsible, admitting that the limits of the ‘new paradigm for the social study of 
childhood’ are becoming increasingly apparent (2005). 
7 For Deleuze, purely actual objects do not exist, but are always surrounded by a ‘cloud’ of 
virtual uncertainty and indeterminancy in the event: ‘Actuals imply already constituted 
individuals, and are ordinarily determined, whereas the relationship of the actual and the 
virtual forms and acting individuation or a highly specific and remarkable singularisation 
which needs to be attended to case by case’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 152).  Brian 
Massumi makes much of the distinction between possibility and potential in the actualisation 
of the virtual, such that possibility understood as a restricted range of potential; possibility is 
what a thing can become without ceasing to be itself (1992).    Yet, possibility acts to 
constrain potential: ‘[p]ossibility is back-formed from potential’s unfolding.  But once it is 
formed, it also effectively feeds back in.  Fedback, it prescripts...  possibilities delineate a 
region of nominally defining - that is, normative - variation.  Potential is unprescripted.  It only 
feeds forward, unfolding toward the registering of an event: bull’s-eye.  Possibility is a variation 
implicit in what a thing can be said to be when it is on target.  Potential is the immanence of 
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a thing to its still indeterminate variation, underway.  Implication is a code word.  Immanence 
is process’ (Massumi,  2002a: 9). 
8 Curtis and Carter begin their book with a quote from Anita Olds which sets the tone of the 
discussion throughout: ‘[c]hildren are miracles.  Believing that every child is a miracle can 
transform the way we design for children’s care.  When we invite a miracle into our lives, we 
prepare ourselves and the environment around us.  We may set out flowers or special 
offerings.  We may cleanse ourselves, the space, or our thoughts of everything but the love 
inside us.  We make it our job to create, with reverence and gratitude, a space that is worthy 
of a miracle!’ (Olds, 1999, in Curtis and Carter, 2003).  Such romanticism is not atypical in 
certain quarters of the nursery educational literature. 
9 The body without organs is a concept which seems to cause particular difficulty in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy.  It is not the body in and straightforward sense: ‘[t]hink of the body 
without organs outside of any determinate state... this is the body from the point of view of its 
potential, its virtuality’ (Massumi, 1992: 70).  It is is without organs because it is not reducible to 
an ‘organism’ and does not belong to a subject, it opens on to the impersonal affects and 
percepts of the event.  The personalised affections and perceptions of particular bodies are 
actualised from the event.  As such, ‘[y]ou can never reach the body without organs ... you 
are forever attaining it’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 150) .    
10 This is not in any way to imply that preschool educators somehow stand outside the event, 
that they can stand outwith processes of subjectification and objectification.  Both children 
and nursery educators are caught up and continually emerge from the eventuality of it. 
11 This may seem odd, given that one of the claims in this paper is that all materials are in 
some way indeterminate and open-ended.  However, Curtis and Carter are referring to a 
specific type of material used in preschool education.  Traditional nursery resources are 
purpose-designed and ‘self-directing’, whereas ‘found’ or recycled materials - cardboard 
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tubing, pine-cones, material remnants - have no predetermined use in the nursery.   Such 
materials are generally associated with ‘creative’ or ‘artistic’ activities in nursery curricula. 
12 This alludes to a line in Peter Jackson’s remake of King Kong (2005): ‘Defeat is always 
momentary’.  Despite Carl Denhams’ various attempts to come out on top, the film ends in 
disaster.  We are told that what we have come to learn about the film-maker is that he has 
an ‘unfailing ability to destroy the things he loves’.  Denham’s optimism and opportunism, 
then, do not by any means guarantee success.  Despite this, Denham keeps going, 
continually striving to turn things to his advantage. 
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